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Peter McCormick* Nom de Plume: Who Writes the Supreme
Court's "By the Court" Judgments?
For several dozen of its major decisions, the Supreme Court in recent decades
has adopted an unusual judgment style-the unanimous and anonymous "By
the Court" format. Unlike judgments attributed to specific justices, "By the Court"
presents an unusual and impersonal institutionalist face. But what is happening
behind the fagade? Are these deeply collegial products with the actual drafting
divided between some (or most, or all) of the justices? Is it "business as usual"
which for major judgments involves rotation between the senior judges? Or is it
simply a pseudonym for the Chief Justice writing alone in an unusually emphatic
way? Function word analysis is used to identify most likely authors for each "By
the Court" decision; this provides a basis for understanding how Supreme Court
practices for these important cases are evolving, and also carries implications for
the likelihood of the current practice surviving the current Chief Justiceship.
Au cours des dernieres ddcennies, dans un grand nombre de ses arr~ts, la Cour
suprdme a adoptd une mdthode inhabituelle de rddaction-ils sont signds de
maniere unanime et anonyme par, <a Cour > Contrairement aux decisions signdes
par des juges, les arr~ts signds par la Cour prdsentent une fagade inhabituelle et
impersonnelle. Mais qu'y a-t-il derriere cette fagade? Ces arr~ts sont-ils le produit
d'un travail collectif, la redaction 6tant confide a certains juges ou la plupart
d'entre eux? Est-ce que les juges travaillent comme ils le font habituellement, ce
qui signifie que la redaction des arr~ts marquants est confide a tour de rdle aux
juges ayant le plus d'anciennet6? Ou est-ce simplement un pseudonyme pour la
juge en chef qui rddige seule avec une empathie inhabituelle? Lanalyse des mots
outils, ou mots fonctionnels, est utilisde pour determiner I'identit6 des auteurs les
plus probables de chacun des arr~ts rendus par la Cour Cette analyse donne
un point de depart pour comprendre comment 6voluent les pratiques de la Cour
suprdme pour ces affaires importantes. Elle souleve aussi la possibilit6 que la
pratique actuelle survivra au depart de Iactuelle juge en chef.
* Department of Political Science, The University of Lethbridge.
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Introduction
The judgments of the Supreme Court of Canada are written by the judges,
but we are not always told which judge did which writing. Normally-
about ninety per cent of the time-the judgments are attributed to a specific
member of the panel, and authorial responsibility is unambiguously
assumed. Since the mid 1990s, about ten per cent of the time they are
attributed to a pair of the judges on the panel.' But even more occasionally,
less than one per cent of the time, they are attributed to "The Court," which
is to say by the panel as a whole with no specific judge being singled out.
The Court as an institution, and therefore no individual judge specifically
and explicitly, assumes the responsibility for the outcome and the reasons.
On these unusual and often important occasions, anonymity and collective
accountability replace named authorship and individual accountability.
These are "By the Court" judgments, a practice which began several
decades ago2 and which has included some of the most high-profile
and controversial decisions of the Supreme Court. For earlier chief
justiceships, the argument for their significance is made by cases like the
Quebec Secession Reference'; for the McLachlin Court, the same point is
made by the Firearms Reference,' the Securities Reference' and the Senate
Reform Reference.6 Both lists could easily be extended. This combination
of persisting but not routine usage, narrow constitutional focus and high
political profile means that those judgments cry out for (but to date have
never received) focused attention. Even more to the point, the frequency
of the use of "By the Court" judgments has increased significantly under
the current Chief Justice, and the occasions of their use show no sign of
becoming less frequent, less high-profile, or less controversial.
The striking feature of the "By the Court" form is that it violates
the longstanding expectation that the individual judges in common
law courts assume responsibility for their judgments by attaching their
name to the reasons that they have written. The Supreme Court itself has
emphasized the importance of adequate written reasons for judgment as
1. See Peter McCormick, "Sharing the Spotlight: Co-Authored Reasons on the Modem Supreme
Court of Canada" (2011) 34:1 Dal LJ 165 [McCormick, "Spotlight"].
2. Most would date it from the two language decisions of the Laskin Court-Blaikie and Forest-
in 1979; I think this is incorrect, and the first significant "By the Court" judgments were a dozen years
earlier, in 1967. See Peter McCormick & Marc Zanoni, "The First 'By the Court' Decisions: The
Emergence of a Practice of the Supreme Court of Canada" Man U (forthcoming).
3. Reference Re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 SCR 217, 161 DLR (4th) 385 [Quebec Secession
Reference].
4. ReferenceRe Firearms Act (Can), 2000 SCC 31, [2000] 1 SCR 783 [Firearms Reference].
5. ReferenceRe SecuritiesAct, 2011 SCC 66, [2011] 3 SCR 837 [Securities Reference].
6. Reference Re Senate Reform, 2014 SCC 32, [2014] 1 SCR 704 [Senate Reference].
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an important element of judicial accountability to the broader public,' and
Mitchel Lasser's broader theoretical framework explains the assumption
of responsibility by identifiable individual judges as making it acceptable
that judges enjoy a degree of discretion in resolving complex issues, to
the extent of allowing policy considerations to guide them.' One face
of this accountability is that we often assess the performance of specific
appeal court judges, past and present, by carefully considering for praise
or criticism the reasons they have written (majority and minority). "By the
Court" judgments are problematic in that they are important decisions-
among the Court's most important-that cannot be accommodated in such
evaluations.
"By the Court" judgments are not attributed to any specific member
of the panel, but does this mean "this was written collectively without any
lead author," or does it mean "we are (for some unstated reason) not going
to tell you who the lead writer was?" I admit to being sceptical about the
first possibility, which implies a genuine committee product with all or
most panel members participating fully; this is not impossible, but it seems
somewhat unlikely in terms both of the readability of the product and the
time-consuming nature of the suggested process. It seems more reasonable
to assume that at least the first draft must (often? usually? always?) have
been written by someone, and that that someone will (sometimes? often?
always?) be a single individual. Any judicial first draft will of course
have been modified in response to feedback from the other members of
the panel, but such a process applies to all judgments, such that they are
all collegial rather than genuinely solo products. "Circulate and revise"
is therefore not enough in itself to explain the anonymous format. The
question is whether it is possible, for some or all of the "By the Court"
judgments, to penetrate this formal anonymity to identify the lead author
or authors, this enquiry being a vehicle to a better understanding of how
the Court operates in some of its most salient and high-profile cases. This
paper will propose a methodology for attempting such a penetration, and
will conclude by sketching the implications of the device and the way that
these writing opportunities are (or are not) shared.
It might seem at least impertinent and at most subversive to go behind
the Court's deliberate wall of anonymity. If they wanted us to know who
did the writing, they would tell us; if they want not to tell us, there must
7. Rv Sheppard, 2002 SCC 26, [2002] 1 SCR 869 is the clearest statement of this; the case has been
cited and refined upon a number of times since.
8. Mitchel de S-O-l'E Lasser, Judicial Deliberations: A Comparative Analysis of Judicial
Transparency and Legitimacy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). See especially chapter 10.
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be a reason that should be honoured. But speculation about who might
have done the writing is a frequent sidebar to the academic reception of
these decisions.9 We already know who wrote several of the early "By
the Court" judgments. Robert Sharpe and Kent Roach, in their biography
of Chief Justice Dickson,10 reveal Dickson as the author of the Manitoba
Language Reference" and Tremblay v. Daiglel2 and point to Le Dain J.
as the actual author of both Ford v. A. G. Quebecl3 and Devine v. A. G.
Quebec."4 Similarly, in his biography of Laskin, Philip Girard insists that
Laskin J. was the author of one of the sets of jointly-authored reasons in
the Patriation Reference." Bora Laskin once let it slip in oral argument
that Martland J. had written one of the earliest examples, and it is widely
known (nobody will tell me precisely how) that McLachlin C.J. wrote the
reasons in Marshall 2.16 My own methodologically grounded speculations
are in the tradition of this recurrent curiosity; the inquiry is perhaps
impertinent, but certainly not subversive.
I. Why does it matter?
It might be suggested that this is a frivolous enquiry because it does not
really matter who wrote the judgment, or even if it had a single lead author
at all. A decision is a decision, and it will decide the immediate case and
establish precedent for the future, regardless of who wrote it." In a strictly
technical sense, this is correct, but it is also a bit misleading. Who writes
always matters because (minor routine cases aside) no two judges will
justify the outcome with quite the same logical trail, or precisely the same
emphasis and nuance, or quite the same implications for future cases.
This is why judges sometimes write long separate concurrences, and why
9. See A Wayne MacKay, "Judicial Process in the Supreme Court of Canada" (1983) 21:1 Osgoode
Hall LJ 55 at 62-63. E.g. in discussing earlier examples of anonymous and jointly authored reasons,
MacKay seeks to identify the style which pervades those reasons-one bears "the distinctive style and
flare" or Chief Justice Laskin, another has the "precise and logical flow" of Martland J., and a third
shows the "style and structure" that characterizes the writing of Beetz.
10. Robert J Sharpe & Kent Roach, Brian Dickson: A Judge & Journey (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press for the Osgoode Society for Canadian Legal History, 2003).
11. Reference Re Manitoba Language Rights, [1985] 1 SCR 721, 19 DLR (4th) 1 [Manitoba
Language Reference].
12. [1989] 2 SCR 530, 62 DLR (4th) 634.
13. [1988] 2 SCR 712, 54 DLR (4th) 577, decided 15 December 1988.
14. [1988] 2 SCR 790, 55 DLR (4th) 641, decided 15 December 1988.
15. Philip Girard, Bora Laskin: Bringing the Law to Life (Toronto: University of Toronto Press for
the Osgoode Society for Canadian Legal History, 2005) at 510.
16. R vMarshall, [1999] 3 SCR 533, 179 DLR (4th) 193.
17. See James Markham, "Against Individually Signed Judicial Opinions" (2006) 56:3 Duke LJ 923.
Markham not only defends the anonymous style but goes on to suggest that all direct attribution of
reasons to specific justices is pernicious, and that judgments and minority reasons alike should all be
presented anonymously.
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sometimes those concurrences can come to be frequently cited in their
own right." The Supreme Court itself reinforces the "author matters"
logic, not only by the fact that almost all its own decisions are linked to
specific individuals, but also by the frequency with which its citations to,
and especially its quotations from, earlier decisions of the Court include
specific reference to the judge who wrote the reasons. Some judges are
known for expertise in particular areas of the law, some carry more prestige
than others,1 9 and some are simply thought of as better judges.2 0 As well,
authored reasons indicate not only the doctrinal evolution of the Supreme
Court as an institution, but also that of the specific judges.
But the stronger reason for pursuing this enquiry is that it offers an
understanding of how the modem Court is organizing itself to handle
particularly controversial (and almost always constitutional) matters.
Consider the possible findings from this study, and the different messages
that it might send.
First, it might be the case that we discover that the writing
assignments simply parallel the assignment of writing for more
complex cases generally 2 1-that is to say, not particularly equal,
but dominated by a number of the more senior and experienced
judges on the Court, one of whom is the Chief Justice. We could
call this the "business as usual" model. It would leave only the
opaque label itself to be explained, without suggesting anything
unusual about the decision-making and decision-explaining
processes themselves.
Second, it might be the case that we find "business as usual" in
a different sense, namely the two-judge co-authorships that first
appeared in the mid 1990s and have become a regular element
(one judgment in every ten, one set of minority reasons in every
ten) for the McLachlin Court.2 2 Sometimes these represent the co-
18. On concurrences, see Peter J McCormick, "Standing Apart: Separate Concurrence and the
Modern Supreme Court of Canada, 1984-2006" (2008) 53:1 McGill LJ 137; on citations to minority
reasons, see Peter J McCormick, "Second Thoughts: Supreme Court Citation of Dissents & Separate
Concurrences, 1949-1996" (2002) 81:2 Can Bar Rev 369.
19. See Richard Posner, Cardozo: A Study in Reputation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1993) on judicial prestige and judicial citation
20. See Cass R Sunstein, "Home-Run Hitters of the Supreme Court," Bloombergriew (23 September
2014), online: <www.bloombergview.com>. American scholars expend a great deal of effort on the
ranking of current and past judges of the United States Supreme Court. On the Canadian context,
see Peter J McCormick, "The Supreme Court Cites the Supreme Court: Follow-Up Citation on the
Supreme Court of Canada, 1989-1993" (1995) 33 Osgoode Hall LJ 453.
21. See Peter J McCormick, "Judgment and Opportunity: Decision Assignment on the McLachlin
Court" (2014) 38:1 Dal LJ 271.
22. See McCormick, "Spotlight," supra note 1.
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authorship of kindred spirits, linking two judges who are often
together when a panel divides; sometimes they link two judges
who often disagree, suggesting reasons that are more in the nature
of a compromise. But in either event, this is a relatively new
practice on the Court, one that is not comparably displayed by
the Supreme Courts of the United States or United Kingdom. We
could call this the "limited partnership" model-"partnership"
because it involves more than one judge, "limited" because it
typically involves only a pair of judges.
Third, it might be the case that it is usually, or even always, the
chief justice who has done the lead writing. If unanimity gives a
decision more emphasis than would be the case if the panel were
divided, and if attribution to the chief justice gives a unanimous
decision more emphasis than attribution to another member of
the panel, then perhaps we should understand "By the Court" as
giving even more emphasis to a chief-justice-authored decision. It
is quite true that chief justices on the modem Supreme Court have
played a predominant role in the delivery of major decisions, and
that this is just as true of the current chief justice as it was of her
three predecessors;2 3 it might be that the "By the Court" device
just ratchets this up another notch. We could call this the "leader-
centric" model.
Fourth, it might be the case that "By the Court" judgments are
genuinely collegial products in a much more pervasive sense
than that implied by the "circulate and revise" process that the
Court has adopted as a regular practice. For example, the United
Kingdom Privy Council has in this century delivered only a single
decision that was anonymously attributed to "The Board" rather
than to an individual.2 4 Because this was so unusual, the Privy
Council did what our Supreme Court has never done: it began
those reasons by explaining this unusual format, saying "This
is a judgment to which all members of the Board have made
substantial contributions."2 5 Perhaps the real message of "By the
Court"-at least for a number of the most portentous cases, those
heavily skewed toward constitutional cases-is that the Supreme
Court is resolving itself into a genuine committee. A genuine
23. See Peter J McCormick, "Who Writes? Gender and Judgment Assignment on the Supreme Court
of Canada" (2014) 51 Osgoode Hall LJ 595, especially Part V, "The Chief Justice Factor."
24. Cukurova Finance International Ltd vAlfa Telecom Turkey Ltd, [2013] UKPC 2.
25. Ibidatparal.
84 The Dalhousie Law Journal
committee that produces a result that cannot be attributed to any
smaller subset of its members, but can only honestly be reported
as a joint product. Given that no other common law court has a
similar practice, this would be a very significant finding. We could
call this the "institutional" model.
It makes a very big difference which of these might be the case. The
"business as usual" model would make a "By the Court" designation a red-
flag priority label, but not one that actually suggests a different decision-
making procedure behind it. The "limited partnership" model would see it
as a cover for another emerging practice on the Court, that of co-authorship,
but one that is far short of the full-panel collaboration the "By the Court"
label seems to suggest. The "leader-centric" model would emphasize the
growing importance of the chief justice, with obvious implications, given
that the current chiefjustice will be leaving the Court within the next three
years. The "institutional" model would highlight a genuine evolution of
the decision-making performance of the Supreme Court of Canada with
respect to the constitutional decisions that have become such an important
part of its caseload. Different roads indeed, and the analysis in this paper
will provide some evidence as to which one of them "By the Court" is
actually taking.
Not out of petty curiosity for gossipy detail, but in order to reach a
deeper understanding of how the Court is evolving in its decision-making
and equally important decision-explaining process, it is necessary to
penetrate the anonymity facade. The Supreme Court of Canada has only
recently become a major national "player," largely, but not only because
of the Charter. It is still evolving in terms of how it deals with this new
role. The regular use of "By the Court" decisions for a significant subset
of major constitutional cases is an innovation that our Supreme Court
has adopted (and other comparable national high courts in common law
countries have not) as part of that adaptive process. To this extent, the
Supreme Court of Canada appears to be emerging as a different kind
of court from its counterparts, one that displays a stronger institutional
dimension. But we need to look behind the "By the Court" to see how deep
this new appearance really goes.
II. Penetrating anonymity: function word analysis
My rebuttable working assumption will be that some single judge on the
Court has in fact assumed the responsibility of writing the first draft of at
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least the analysis section of reasons for the judgment/opinion.2 6 "By the
Court" judgments give no indications on their face as to the judge, so it is
necessary to find some way of matching writing to writer.
We are not, of course, looking for a genuine "sole author" as if the
others were passive sidelined bystanders. This is not the case even for
those judgments attributed to a single judge. The better understanding is
that this designation indicates the lead writer, the writer of the first draft
that is then circulated for comment, revised in the light of those comments,
and re-circulated through several iterations. All judgments of the Supreme
Court are in this sense collegial products. The question is whether the
collegiality apparently promised by the solid anonymity of "By the Court"
really is something that is significantly different from the more normal style
of judgment, or whether there is still a lead writer who can be empirically
uncovered. Knowing about this practice of revision in response to critical
feedback complicates the search, but it does not necessarily forestall it.
It would be ideal if one could find words or phrases uniquely attached
to individual judges. For example, it is a fairly common device for judges
to reach a conclusion, and then go on to say "I am reinforced in this
conclusion by some additional argument or authority." This is so common
that finding the phrase in a judgment does nothing to identify the author.
A slightly more unusual way to make the same rhetorical point is to say "I
am fortified in this conclusion," which has been used a much more modest
number of times by a smaller number of judges. By far the most frequent
user of the phrase is Laskin, so finding those words in one of the early "By
the Court" judgments would suggest but not prove that Laskin J. did the
writing.2 7 A more unusual variant is "I am bolstered in this conclusion," a
phrase so unusual that only lacobucci J. has ever used it (or any variants
of "bolster").2 8 Obviously, as this example demonstrates, it is sheer luck
to trip over such a uniquely idiosyncratic word or phrase, and sheer luck
again to find it used in a "By the Court" judgment; as a consequence, this
does not present itself as a workable solution to the challenge.
However, the extreme example makes a basic point: we can find clues
as to who did the writing from looking closely at the words that were
written, and in the modem world that can mean computer-assisted linguistic
analysis. What makes this approach encouraging is the fact that identifying
authorship is precisely the purpose to which such linguistic analysis has
26. "Judgment" is the term the Court uses for its decisions on appeals; "opinion" is the term the
Court uses when it is dealing with a federal reference.
27. The more so because his contemporary colleague Martland J. was the second most frequent user
of the phrase.
28. Unfortunately, this specific word does not occur in any "By the Court" judgment.
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often been directed-penetrating the details of word use to decide whether
or not a specific famous author did or did not write a particular poem, essay
or book. One of the standard examples is proving which of the American
Founding Fathers wrote the small number of Federalist Papers essays that
have no stated author. The argument is that different people use words
in different but persisting ways, and computer analysis of those words is
therefore a way of linking texts to specific writers. This really amounts
to an attempt to find a more objective way of identifying "style" than the
intuitive process exemplified by A. Wayne Mackay,29 but it is in principle
the same enquiry.
One widely used example of such linguistic analysis is the Linguistic
Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC, pronounced "luke") software developed
by James Pennebaker.30 The system is based on generating dictionaries that
direct the assignment of words to categories, such as adjectives, adverbs,
positive emotion words, negative emotion words, cognitive words,
complexity words, certainty words. The specific purpose of the software
was to track psychological coping with traumatic circumstances, the
balance between different sets of words helping a psychologist to track a
return to normality in pieces of writing solicited from the patient.31 Absent
trauma, these same researchers suggest that a balance between these sets
of words is a persisting individual characteristic with (sometimes) an
element of tactical choice, and have applied it to a consideration of, for
example, the United States presidential campaign debates.32
Signature is an example of word-analysis software that is rather more
reductionist, pursuing individual stylistic choices at an even more basic
level.33 It tracks how many times a particular piece of writing uses each
letter of the alphabet or each punctuation mark, how many sentences
contain how many words, and how many paragraphs contain how many
sentences. This is the software that allowed Oxford professor Peter
Millican to "out" J.K. Rowling (who was trying to move out from under
the limiting shadow of her Harry Potter success by publishing under the
29. MacKay, supra note 9.
30. Software available online: <www.liwc.net>; see also James W Pennebaker, The Secret Life of
Pronouns: What Our Words Say About Us (New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2011).
31. See James W Pennebaker, Opening Up: The Healing Power ofExpressing Emotion (New York:
Guilford Press, 1997); and James W Pennebaker & John Evans, Expressive Writing: Words That Heal
(Enumclaw, WA: Idyll Harbour, 2014).
32. See Pennebaker's website Wordwatchers: Tracking the Language of Public Figures, online
<www.wordwatchers.wordpress.com>.
33. See the Signature Stylometric System, online: <www.philocomp.net>.
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pseudonym of Robert Galbraith) as the author of a new work of fiction.34
I was not successful in deriving any comparable certainty or success from
using this software.
I will be following instead the example of Frederick Mosteller and
David L. Wallace,3 5 and the way their approach was applied to a study of
judicial decisions in this and other countries by Jeffrey S. Rosenthal and
Albert H. Yoon.3 6 This analysis works around the concept of "function
words"-we can characterize writing and we can identify the stylistic
practices of individual writers not by looking at the concept-content words
(nouns, verbs, adjectives) in their writing, but rather by looking at the
more pedestrian "function words" that connect and smooth and qualify
and intensify those words. Everyone uses words like "the," "and," "of,"
"to," "or," "but" and "if' to such an extent that words of this sort make up
a surprising proportion of everything we write. But each person relies on
them to a subtly but pervasively different extent, inclining toward the use
of some of them and away from others.
Reduced to single elements, these observations border on the trivial.
For example:
* Binnie J. uses "but" three times as often as Karakatsanis J.
* Moldaver J. uses "could" two and a half times as often as
lacobucci J.
* McLachlin C. uses "must" two and a half times as often as
Binnie J.
* McLachlin C. uses "whether" two and a half times as often as
Binnie J.
* McLachlin C. uses "may" two and a half times as often as
Abella J.
* Abella J. uses "also" twice as often as Binnie J.
* Major J. uses "if' half again as often as Rothstein J.
* Rothstein J. uses "would" half again as often as Binnie J.
Any one such observation carries little meaning or utility. Multiplied
across dozens of words and for every possible pair of judges, however,
they become considerably more powerful, an accumulation of small
hints adding up to something much more substantial. "Magic" words
34. See Nick Clark, "I Turned Down 'Robert Galbraith,"' The Guardian (16 July 2013), online:
<www.guardianco.uk>.
35. See Frederick Mosteller & David L Wallace, Inference and DisputedAuthorship: The Federalist
(Reading, UK: Addison-Wesley, 1964).
36. See Jeffrey S Rosenthal & Albert H Yoon, "Judicial Ghostwriting: Authorship on the Supreme
Court" (2011) 96:6 Cornell LR 1307; Kelly Bodwin, Jeffrey S Rosenthal & Albert H Yoon, "Opinion
Writing and Authorship on the Supreme Court of Canada" (2013) 63:3 UTLJ 159.
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as "always" or "never" indicators not being available, their precise
opposite-words that every judge uses some of the time, but that some
consistently use more or less often than others-can in their aggregate
be just as useful.
Rosenthal and Yoon's use of the approach is directed in exactly the
opposite direction from mine. They sought to characterize the use of
law clerks by the justices of the United States Supreme Court and of
the Supreme Court of Canada by measuring the variability in the use
of a standard set of function words within the reasons for judgment
delivered by individual judges. Given a tendency for any individual
to display a consistent pattern of function word usage, it follows that
greater levels of variance in these patterns from one judgment to the
next will suggest that other individuals were involved in the drafting.
Their hypothesis is that these other individuals were the law clerks that
have for decades assisted Supreme Court justices in both countries.
Rosenthal and Yoon are looking for diversity, for non-similarity, as
a way of identifying those judges who have leaned most heavily on
drafting by their clerks; I am looking for similarity, as a way of deciding
which judge may have written reasons not attributed to a single judge.
However, we are following the same logic-comparing the function-
word frequencies of different pieces of writing, on the argument that
similarity in the patterns makes it more likely, and dissimilarity in the
patterns makes it less likely, that the same person did the writing.3 7 I
acknowledge my intellectual debt for this approach.
III. The database
The basic element of the methodology is to generate a baseline
background pattern for the frequency of function word usage for each
of the Court judges who have served on "By the Court" panels during
the McLachlin chiefjustice ship. This involves putting very large blocks
of words into a word-frequency counter and pulling out the numbers
for the words that we have identified as deserving attention. This raises
two questions: first, what block of words should we accumulate, and
second, which words should we count? I will deal with each in turn.
The basic building block for this background word count is the
solo reasons for judgment attributed to each of the judges during the
full period of the McLachlin Court, but this raw material needs a
double refinement before it can serve the purpose. The first refinement
37. The suggestion that a rotating collection of law clerks have done a certain amount of the
writing is a problem for me. Below, I will seek to deflect this possible objection to my use of the
methodology.
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is the removal of the direct quotations that make up a significant part of
Supreme Court judgments. I am referring only to the "block quotes" that
are separated into their own double-indented blocks within the reasons.
Sometimes, the word count involved in these is rather small-indeed,
occasionally it is zero-but other times it can be quite significant, up
to 25% or 30% of the total. For this reason, I have a reservation about
Rosenthal and Yoon's application of the methodology. Unless lengthy
direct quotations are excluded, they will seriously skew the measure, for
the obvious reason that these quotation marks already signal that "these
are not my words," and therefore "this is not my function word usage."
Rosenthal and Yoon suggest that a large variation in function word usage
strongly suggests a different writer (i.e., a law clerk); my point is that to
a sometimes significant extent it might also-and more often for some
judges than others-mean lots of direct quotations.
Overall, about one sixth of all the words in the Court's aggregated
reasons for judgment take the form of a direct quotation from a statute
or the constitution, from rulings of the courts below, from the judicial
decisions cited as authority, from academic books and articles, or from
official reports or Hansard. The proportion of block-quotation words of
course vanes from case to case, but to rather a surprising extent it also
varies consistently from judge to judge. The variation is so pronounced-
on the current Court, from the high "one word in four" for Abella J. to the
low "one word in twenty" for McLachlin C.-that I will use this as a
supplementary check on my findings.
The word count for reserved single-judge-attributed decisions for the
fifteen years to date of the McLachlin Court is about six million words;
removing the block quotes reduces this count to about five million-the
one word in six" generalization above.
The second problem with this word count is the one that was suggested
(and allegedly confirmed) by Bodwin, Rosenthal and Yoon referred
to above: at least for some judges and at least for part of the reasons of
judgment, the function word-count variability is such that some of the
writing seems to have been done by somebody else, and that somebody
else seems not always to have been the same person. The obvious suspects
are the law clerks. But if law clerks are involved in the drafting this would
be more likely to involve the more routine parts of the judgment-the
background facts, the facts of the case, the decisions in the lower courts-
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that are a regular part of the modem format of Supreme Court decisions.3 8
It seems less likely that there would be any comparable involvement in the
writing of the analysis section that makes up the larger part of the reasons.
Therefore, only these analysis sections will go into my background figures
for each justice. This further reduces the total word count from five million
to just under 3.75 million-a reduction of about one quarter.
For each justice, the remaining fragments of all their solo-attributed
reasons were combined and run through the word frequency counter
on http://www.writewords.org.uk. The results were accumulated into a
spreadsheet and turned into percentages, and the same process was then
followed for each of the "By the Court" judgments that are to be examined.
The analysis that follows builds on the total of the absolute values of the
differences between each judge's use of each word and the use of the
word in the target judgment, resulting in "similarity scores" that fluctuate
between 4 per cent and 14 per cent.
IV. Which words?
Judges use thousands of words. The obvious question, then, is which words
provide a valid basis for comparison? There are implicit multiple criteria:
* First, they must be neutral function words, not skewed toward
certain types of cases (criminal, civil, Charter, or whatever) or
certain types of analysis that characterize some judges more than
others.
* Second, they must be ordinary words that everyone uses all the
time, words so obvious that they are on the one hand easily taken
for granted but on the other hand such an implicit part of writing
style so as to develop a regular pattern of usage, a consistent
feeling for what feels right and what words help it feel right.
* Third, this frequency of use must be high enough that it will be
sensitive to style. It should be such that we can expect it to occur
in every reasonably long set of reasons on any question, thereby
creating room for regular patterns of "a bit more than usual, a bit
less than usual" to emerge.
* Fourth, there must in fact be a demonstrable and persisting
variation in the usage of these words from one judge to another, so
that a substantial part of the actual word usage in any specific "By
the Court" judgment can reasonably be attributed to an author's
tendencies rather than some more case-specific circumstance.
38. See Peter J McCormick, "Structures of Judgment: How the Modem Supreme Court of Canada
Organizes its Reasons" (2009) 32:2 Dal U 35 for a consideration of the elements into which the
modem Supreme Court judgment is divided.
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Morteller and Wallace suggested a list of neutral but frequent function
words. Rosenthal and Yoon modified this list, dropping words that were
not used frequently enough to be useful. I have further modified the list for
the same reason and on the same criteria. I arrive at a total of 44 words,3 9
each of which was used at least once in every thousand words for the
3.75 million words from the database described above. Since the length
of the average McLachlin Court "By the Court" judgment (minus block
quotations, minus routine sections) is 8,500 words, this means that the
average judgment will include eight or nine examples of even the "bottom
of the list" words selected. For those words higher on this list, their
occurrence within the average judgment will be correspondingly higher.
The methodology rests on several assumptions, such that the failure
of any one of them would seriously compromise its credibility. The first
is that the function words indicated together constitute a large enough
fraction of the total, and a consistent enough fraction for the individual
judges, that they can provide a reliable basis for word frequency use. This
is satisfied, because these 44 words make up just over 40% of the total
word-count, and the spread for individual judges is a very modest 3.7%
between Arbour's 38.8 % and Wagner's 42.5 %. The narrow band between
40% and 42% catches 14 of 18 judges who have served on the McLachlin
Court. These are not exotic words, but every-day every-communication
words.
The second is that there is a reasonable but nonetheless significant
variation in the use of the various words that it establishes a "more often/
less often" continuum rather than an "often uses/never uses" dichotomy.
This too is satisfied because over the 44 words, the average ratio between
the highest and the lowest usage rate for individual judges is 2 to 1, and
only one of these ("such") is as high as 4:1. The usage rates therefore
reflect the differing style of judges as they use the same general set of the
most fundamental words that make up the large part of anything that any
of the judges have to say.
The third is that there must be real and persisting differences between
the individual judges, and these differences must be small enough to show
that we are looking for variations within a general behavior rather than
different behaviors, and large enough that they can be detected and can
constitute a reasonable basis for evaluation. For this purpose, and for the
analyses of "By the Court" judgments below, these differences will be
39. Four of these "words" actually represent totals for several words. I treated "a" and "an" as the
same word for counting purposes. Similarly, I have combined the various forms of the three most
common verbs ("to be" and "to do" and "to have") to be treated as a single "word."
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reduced to a single number which will be called the Similarity Score,
calculated as follows: For each word, the absolute value of the difference
between that word's percentage frequency for each of the two periods is
calculated. This is then summed across the 44 words to generate a score
which reflects the percentage of words which are different (either more
frequent or less frequent) between the two sets. The differences between
McLachlin (the Chief Justice, one of only two judges who have served the
whole period, and the one with the largest total word count) with each of
her colleagues are as follows:
Similarity Score Differences: McLachlin & Colleagues
Judge Similarity Score Judge Similarity Score
Abella 4.547% Iacobucci 3.398%
Arbour 4.554% Karakatsanis 3.089%
Bastarache 3.693% L'Heureux-Dub6 4.913%
Binnie 3.828% LeBel 4.260%
Charron 4.044% Major 3.772%
Cromwell 2.988% Moldaver 5.438%
Deschamps 3.791% Rothstein 3.048%
Fish 3.715% j Wagner 5.204%
Gonthier 3.290% 1
These differences are large enough to support the hypothesis of a
systematic and persisting difference between the individual judges in
terms of the way that they use the same standard set of function words.
The fourth condition is that the total count for judges must actually
reflect an enduring tendency around which their word usage in any
individual judgment oscillates, rather than something more random or
haphazard. This is assessed by dividing the word usage totals for the
two longest serving (and therefore highest total word-count) judges-
McLachlin C.J. and Binnie J., at the midpoint of the chief justiceship,
and then to assess the similarity of the usage patterns for each half. For
McLachlin C.J., this difference is 2.0%; for Binnie J., it is 2.25%. This
is well below the differences between pairs of judges suggested above,
satisfying this condition as well.
These conditions satisfied, the following are the 44 function words
used for this analysis, with a frequency count from the 3.75 million word
aggregate word total (and the percentage of the total word count) for each.
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2000-2014
Word Count Percentage Word Count Percentage
The 332,510 8.91% No 8,892 0.24%
Of 166,124 4,45% Under 8,473 0.23%
[To be] 40  133,019 3.56% May 8,296 0.22%
To 114,140 3.06% Whether 7,800 0.21%
A/An' 100,067 2.68% Must 7,707 0.21%
In 91,306 2.45% There 7,662 0.20%
That 73,220 1.96% If 7,360 0.20%
And 67,256 1.80% Their 6,655 0.18%
Not 31,795 0.85% Such 6,377 0.17%
As 28,553 0.76% Will 6,366 0.17%
For 28,299 0.76% But 6,288 0.17%
It 28,213 0.75% Any 5,911 0.16%
[To have] 42 28,140 0.75% Also 5,486 0.15%
At 27,816 0.74% Only 5,467 0.15%
This 27,477 0.74% One 5,322 0.14%
On 26,316 0.71% Where 5,294 0.14%
Or 23,749 0.64% All 4,907 0.13%
With 19,016 0.51% Can 4,762 0.13%
[To do] 4 3  13,718 0.36% When 4,439 0.12%
Which 12,244 0.33% Could 4,339 0.12%
From 11,970 0.32% More 4,090 0.11%
Would 11,883 0.32% Who 3,765 0.10%
V. Confronting a possible problem: the language issue
It may seem that I have glossed over a very significant problem, that being
the bilingual nature of the Supreme Court-the fact that some judges write
in English (with an official French translation) and others write in French
(with an official English translation). This being the case, function word
analysis faces a double hurdle. First, the method will be comparing the
direct language use of Anglophone judges with the translated version of
40. Including six words: are, be, been, is, was, were.
41. Including the count for both "a" and "an"
42. Including three words: had, has, have.
43. Including three words: did, do, does.
94 The Dalhousie Law Journal
what was actually written in another language by their French colleagues.
Second, we may not even know what language the "By the Court"
judgment was initially written in. Thus we will not know whether the
translation complication is present when we look at the scores for the
English judges, or whether there is a double translation problem (first for
the generation of their all-judgment patterns, then for the generation of the
patterns for the particular "By the Court" judgment) underlying the scores
for the francophone judges.
In fact, this is not a problem at all, because we know that all but one
of the Court's "By the Court" judgments were initially written in English.
This is not guesswork, but something presented directly in the Supreme
Court Reports. The normal practice since the 1970s has been to publish
judgments in both languages; but one of those two versions is introduced
as the "version francaise"/"English version" of what is simply presented
as "the judgment/le jugement" in what is thereby revealed to be the
initial language of writing. Although many of the justices on the Supreme
Court are reasonably bilingual, and some occasionally write judgments
or minority reasons in their second language, it seems a reasonable
assumption that for that subset of significant cases that draws the "By the
Court" style, typically involving an extended analysis of constitutional
issues, judges are unlikely to be writing in their second language.
This telegraphing of the language of writing was not always the case
-for the (on my count) 24 major "By the Court" decisions delivered
between 1979 and 1999, just over half (13) were presented in such a way
as not to provide this information; "the judgment" in English was directly
balanced by "le jugement" in French with no hint on the face of it as to
which was the original and which the translation. All but one of the Laskin
Court's major "By the Court" judgments took this form, as well as half of
the "By the Court" judgments of the Dickson and Lamer Courts. For the
McLachlin Court, however, only the three companion cases of Solski,
Gosselin, and Okwubi fail to provide this "initial language of writing"
indication.4 4 Why this initially solid practice was first attenuated and then
abandoned I could not say. It does seem to me that it undermines a practice
otherwise characterized by complete anonymity.
For present purposes, however, the abandonment of the early practice
is most convenient. All but one of the major "By the Court" judgments of
the McLachlin Court are presented as having been first written in English,
44. Solski (Tutor of v Quebec (AG), 2005 SCC 14, [2005] 1 SCR 201; Gosselin (Tutor of v Quebec
(AG), 2005 SCC 15, [2005] 1 SCR 238; Okwuobi v Lester B Pearson School Board, 2005 SCC 16,
[2005] 1 SCR 257 [Gosselin trilogy].
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and then translated into French, which I will take as an indication that they
were written by a justice whose first language is English." This being the
case, the "language of writing" issue does not complicate the application
of function word analysis, although under the Court's earlier practices
it would have done so. I will comment later on the implications of this
indication that "By the Court" seems to have been so dominated by the
Anglophone judges.
VI. Applying the methodology
The methodology described and the background judge-by-judge totals
in place, it remains to review the 22 "By the Court" judgments of the
McLachlin Court. "Twenty-two in sixteen years" makes its own case for
the significance of the anonymous judgment device-often enough to
constitute a practice, but rare enough to be unusual. The subject matter
confirms this appearance, given that it is heavily focused on constitutional
issues.
"By the Court" Judgments of the McLachlin Court
Case Citation Reference? Type of law Length
Re Firearms Act 2000 SCC 31 Yes' Federalism 8,417 words
R. v. Latimer 2001 SCC 1 No Charter 10,714 words
United States v. Burns & 2001 SCC 7 No Charter 20,139 words
Rafay
Suresh v. Canada 2002 SCC 1 No Charter 18,080 words
R. v. Powley 2003 SCC 43 No First Nations 6,408 words
R. v. Blais 2003 SCC 44 No First Nations 5,538 words
Wewaykum Indian Band v. 2003 SCC 45 No Courts/recusal 11,960 words
Canada
Re Same Sex Marriage 2004 SCC 79 Yes Federalism 7,232 words
Solski v. Quebec (A.G.) 2005 SCC 14 No Language/Charter 9,794 words
Gosselin v. Quebec (A.G.) 2005 SCC 15 No Language/Charter 4,095 words
Okwuobi v. School Board 2005 SCC 16 No Language/Charter 8,052 words
Mugesera v. Canada 2005 SCC 40 No Courts/judicial review 19,641 words
Provincial JudgesAssn 2005 SCC 44 No Courts/independence 19,307 words
Canada (Justice) v. Khadr 2008 SCC 28 No Charter 4,468 words
BCEInc. v. Debentureholders 2008 SCC 69 No Commercial law 15,777 words
Canada (Prime Minister) v. 2010 SCC 03 No Charter 5,461 words
Khadr
45. Both Bastarache J. and Fish J. will be included as "English first language" justices, on the
grounds that their attributed judgments for the Court are almost always (19 times out of a randomly
selected 20) written in English and translated into French
46. Reference to provincial Court of Appeal, taken on appeal to Supreme Court of Canada.
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R. v. Ahmad 2011 SCC 06 No Charter 9,626 words
Re Securities Act 2011 SCC 55 Yes Federalism 14,148 words
Re Supreme CtAct (Nadon) 2014 SCC 21 Yes Courts/federalism 12,205 words
Re Senate Reform 2014 SCC 32 Yes Federalism 15,032 words
Carter v. Canada 2015 SCC 5 No Charter 16,309 words
R. v Smith 2015 SCC 34 No Charter 3,776 words
Actually, "22" understates the count: the real total is closer to sixty,
but two-thirds of those are extremely short, including a good number of
oral "from the bench" judgments. Elsewhere, I have referred to these
as the "minor tradition" of "By the Court" judgments, as distinguished
from the "grand tradition" decisions that are included in the list above.47
It is not that these minor cases are without interest in their own right, but
they need to be distinguished from the extended sets of reasons that settle
major issues of (usually if not quite always) constitutional law. The cutoff
point that I have used is 2500 words, which is to say about five pages of
normal text. It does not seem to me that sets of reasons that fall below
this (and many of the "minor tradition" decisions fall well below it, in
the low hundreds and occasionally mere dozens of words) constitute a
major contribution to the Court's jurisprudence. A further practical reason
is that as the judgments get shorter there is not enough material for this
methodology to get any traction.4 ' The excision of the routine material
(summary of facts, summary of decisions in the lower courts, statement
of issues) aggravates this problem. The focus of this paper, therefore, is
the twenty-two major "By the Court" judgments of the McLachlin Court.
Three of the cases depart from the normal format that introduces
the reasons with the formulaic phrase "The following is the judgment
delivered by THE COURT." The three unusual cases are Wewaykum
Indian Band v. Canada, Mugesera v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship
and Immigration), and Nadon, but in my judgment they are not unusual
enough to be excluded.
* Wewaykum 200349 was a case that arose when it turned out that
Binnie J. had delivered the reasons for a unanimous decision of
the Court (Wewaykum 2002") despite having been involved in a
much earlier stage of the case while serving as Associate Deputy
47. See McCormick & Zanoni, supra note 2.
48. Especially when the reasons for judgment approach or reach their reductionist apotheosis in the
formulaic minimum "this appeal is dismissed for the reasons given in the court below." See e.g. Re
PrivacyAct (Canada), 2001 SCC 89, [2001] 3 SCR 905.
49. Wewaykum Indian Bandy Canada, 2003 SCC 45, [2003] 2 SCR 259 [Wewaykum 2003].
50. Wewaykum Indian Bandy Canada, 2002 SCC 79, [2002] 4 SCR 245.
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Minister of Justice (although it was not seriously questioned
that he had simply forgotten). Obviously, he should therefore
have recused himself; because he had not only taken part in the
hearing of the appeal but also delivered the reasons for judgment,
the band applied for an order to set the judgment aside. Binnie
J. recused himself (of course) from the consideration of the
application, which was unanimously dismissed by the other eight
judges; this was presented as a judgment delivered jointly and
collectively by all eight of the judges, their names listed in order
of seniority. However, the combination of high-profile anonymity
and unanimity is fully congruent with the "By the Court" style.
Mugesera involved the attemptby the federal government to deport
an individual for his involvement in the Rwanda massacres."1 The
Supreme Court case arose from the federal government's appeal
of the judgment of the Federal Court of Appeal setting aside the
deportation order. Again, recusal was an element in this case, the
husband of newly appointed Abella J. having been involved in a
group that had made representations to the Minister on the subject;
and again there was a consideration of an application (this time for
a permanent stay of proceedings) heard by the other eight judges
of the Court, who unanimously dismissed it. The decision on the
application was delivered in the same format as Wewaykum: the
"judgment of the Court" was delivered jointly by the eight judges,
their names listed in order of seniority. This same style-judgment
by eight listed names-was carried over to the Court's judgment
on the appeal itself 52
The Reference Re Supreme Court Act (the Nadon case) is the
most unusual of the three non-standard inclusions.5 3 If "By the
Court" implies both anonymity and unanimity, neither Wewaykum
nor Mugesera is a real problem. But in Nadon, the Court was not
unanimous, there being a solo dissent by Moldaver J. The other
seven judges on the eight-judge panel" delivered an opinion (not a
judgment, because it was a reference case) jointly attributed to the
sevenjudges ofthe majority, their names listed in order of seniority.
51. Mugesera v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 SCC 39, [2005] 2 SCR 91
[Mugesera].
52. The decision on Mugesera's application is not included in this analysis because of its brevity, less
than 2,000 words.
53. Reference Re Supreme CourtAct, ss5 and 6,2014 SCC 21, [2014] 1 SCR 433 [Nadon Reference].
54. Rothstein J. recused himself as the only member of the Court who had been elevated from the
Federal Court of Appeal, this being one of the issues at play.
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Such an anonymous format for a significant constitutional case
justifies inclusion despite the dissent.
VII. The cases
This section will describe the application of the methodology, and the
results that are generated, for each of the cases in the Table.
1. Reference Re Firearms Act (Can.)
The Firearms Reference was the Alberta government's challenge to the
federal legislation that established the long-gun registry (since abolished
by the Harper government)." Alberta's argument was that the legislation
was not a legitimate exercise of the national government's criminal law
power under section 91 of the Constitution Act 1867, but rather an attempt
to regulate property that improperly intruded on the provincial jurisdiction
over property and civil rights within the province under section 92. That
is to say: it was a straightforward division of powers federalism case of
the sort that has frequently occurred in Canadian history. The Court's
unanimous conclusion was that the legislation was a valid exercise of
Parliament's jurisdiction over the criminal law.
It is unusual for the Supreme Court to use the "By the Court" format
for an appeal from a provincial reference case. The McLachlin Court
to date has decided six such cases, five of which were unanimous, but
only this one used the anonymous format, making it the first provincial
reference appeal in two decades to take this form.5 6
A word count for the analysis section of the judgment was reduced
to percentages paralleling those of each judge's accumulated word usage
counts. The absolute value of the differences in the use of each word
was calculated and summed for all of the words for each of the judges,
generating a total that is here labeled a "similarity score." The score
reflects the proportion of the total words in the judgment (calculated as
a percentage of all words, not just the total for the words in the list) that
differs-either higher or lower-from the distribution that would have
precisely paralleled each judge's accumulated word usage percentages.
Lower scores reflect a smaller departure, and therefore make the case that
a particular judge is more likely to have written the reasons.
But "lower score" (in particular, "lower enough to be taken as
decisive") needs a reference point, and that will be the function word
count for the 3.75 million words for all of the significant judgments of the
55. Firearms Reference, supra note 4.
56. That is to say, the first since McEvoy v New Brunswick (AG) et al, [1983] 1 SCR 704, [1983] SCJ
No 51 (QL).
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McLachlin Court and its similarity score for the immediate case. This is a
more objective process than simply eye-balling the numbers, suggesting
the way that a notional "Justice Completely Average" would have deployed
function words to generate the reasons. What will drive the choice as to
whether the similarity score indicates a clear outcome is the ratio of each
judge's similarity score to this "all judges" reference point.
Similarity Scores for Firearms Reference
Judge Similarity Score All-Judge








The figures strongly support a conclusion that McLachlin C.J. is the most
likely of the judges to have been the lead writer of the decision. This
conclusion follows not so much from the absolute score itself as from the
fact that it is lower by a comfortable margin than that of the other judges
on the panel-in order to write the words of the analysis section of the
Firearms Reference, McLachlin C.J. would have had to make much less of
an adjustment to her long-term preferred word-usage than any other judge
on the panel. As will be seen below, this is an unusually decisive outcome.
2. R. v. Latimer
The Latimer case involved Robert Latimer, who was convicted of killing
his severely physically and mentally disabled daughter.17 It was never
seriously challenged that this was a mercy killing, prompted by concern
for the girl's suffering as she underwent a series of painful operations
with no prospect for long-term improvement. However, the Criminal
Code dictates a statutory mandatory minimum sentence (and mandatory
minimum period for parole eligibility) for second-degree murder,
with no provision for mercy killing as either a defence or a mitigating
circumstance." The jury that convicted Latimer recommended a less-than-
statutory-minimum sentence, and the presiding judge complied, but the
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal to restore the
57. Rv Latimer, 2001 SCC 1, [2001] 1 SCR 3.
58. Criminal Code of Canada, RSC 1985, c C-46, ss 235, 745.
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mandatory minimum, and the Supreme Court upheld that decision. The
Charter challenge invoked the "cruel and unusual punishment" section of
the Charter,59 and the issue of a constitutional exemption was (curiously)
identified by the Court as one of the issues to be dealt with, but ultimately
left aside as not necessary to answer.
Similarity Scores for R. v. Latimer
Judge Similarity Score All-Judge







The similarity score figures point to Major J. as the most likely initial
author of the reasons. McLachlin C.J.'s similarity score for Latimer is
even lower than that for the Firearms Reference, and also lower than that
of the notional average judge, but this is not the thrust of the methodology.
The critical factor is not the score itself but rather the identification of
the judge for whom there is the least degree of displacement from their
personal preferred point. For Latimer, that person is Major J.
3. United States v. Bums and Rafay
This extradition case involved two Canadian teenagers who were accused
(and ultimately convicted) of a gruesome murder in the United States,
allegedly killing Rafay's parents and sister for his inheritance .60 When they
were arrested in Canada, the State of Washington applied to extradite them
to stand trial in that state. As provided for under the Extradition Act and the
Canada/U.S. extradition treaty, the federal Minister of Justice considered
but decided against requesting assurances that the death penalty would not
be sought, imposed or carried out.61 Bums and Rafay argued that this was
a violation of their Charter rights to liberty and security of the person, 62
and were successful in the British Columbia Court of Appeal, which set
aside the extradition order.63 The Supreme Court upheld the decision, and
59. Canadian Charter ofRights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule
B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11, s 12.
60. United States v Burns, 2001 SCC 7, [2001] 1 SCR 283 [Burns].
61. Ibidatpara3.
62. Charter, supra note 57, s 7. Curiously, they did not argue the right to life under section 7.
63. Burns, supra note 58, atpara 20.
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its judgment reversed the balance of the extradition treaty (from "seek
assurances when particular facts warrant that special exercise" to "seek
assurances unless particular facts warrant it not being exercised") with
an extended argument against the death penalty grounded in judicial
fallibility.64
Similarity Scores for United States v. Burns
Judge Similarity Score All-Judge








The word usage similarity scores point to Binnie J. as the most likely
initial author. Notwithstanding the fact that this score is the lowest that
has yet emerged from this analysis, this identification is made somewhat
tentative by the fact that all the similarity scores are low, particularly those
of Arbour and lacobucci JJ. The logic of this methodology still directs
Binnie J. as the most likely author, and I will be taking the 5% spread
in the all-judge ratio as enough to justify this conclusion, but the slight
margin between Binnie J. and his colleagues necessitates treating this as
more tentative and less conclusive than the previous cases considered.
4. Suresh v. Canada
Suresh involved a Convention refugee from Sri Lanka who had applied
for landed immigrant status.65 The Canadian government had commenced
deportation proceedings based on findings that he was a member of a
terrorist organization (the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam). The Minister
also issued an opinion declaring him to be a danger to the security of
Canada (as provided for in the Immigration Act) but had neither provided
him with a copy of the immigration officer's memorandum on which the
finding was based nor afforded him the opportunity to respond to the finding
orally or in writing.6 6 Suresh applied for judicial review challenging both
the Minister's decision and the fairness of the procedures provided for in
64. Ibid, at paras 98-104, 127.
65. Suresh v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 SCC 1, [2002] 1 SCR 3.
66. Ibidatparal.
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the legislation, and also claiming a violation of the Charter. The Court
allowed his appeal to the extent of ordering a new deportation hearing but
upheld the legislation itself as constitutional.6 7
Similarity Scores for Suresh v. Canada
Judge Similarity Score All-Judge








The similarity score clearly points to McLachlin C.J. as the initial author.
Not only is hers the lowest score of the set (indeed, the second lowest
score generated for any judge in any case by this methodology), but the
spread between her score and that of the closest judges on the panel is
unusually high. This is one of the most decisive outcomes of the nineteen.
5a. R. v. Powley
5b. R. v. Blais
Powley involved a father and son, members of a Metis community near
Sault Ste. Marie, who shot and killed a bull moose without the required
hunting license or validation tag. They were charged with unlawfully
hunting moose out of season. Hadthey been status Indians, the requirements
would not have been enforced in recognition of the aboriginal right to hunt
for food; because they were Metis, provincial officials did not allow them
such an exemption. They argued that under section 35 of the Constitution
Act, 1982 they were entitled to the same treatment as status Indians. 68 The
provincial court trial judge ruled in their favour, a decision upheld by the
Ontario Superior Court of Justice, the Ontario Court of Appeal, and the
Supreme Court. 6 9 The finding was that members of an enduring Metis
community of distinctive collective identity also enjoyed the aboriginal
right to hunt for food and Ontario's failure to recognize this right violated
section 35.70
67. Ibidatpara5.
68. Rv Powley, 2003 SCC 43, [2003] 2 SCR 207.
69. Ibidatpara7.
70. Ibid, atparas 53-55.
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Blais similarly involved a M6tis, this time in Manitoba, who was
charged with hunting deer out of season. He argued that he should enjoy
the same right to hunt for food as the "Indians" referred to in the 1930
Natural Resources Transfer Agreements (NRTA)." His membership in
the M6tis community, and the continued existence of identifiable M6tis
communities in Manitoba for more than a century, were not in dispute. The
case was entirely about whether M6tis were included in the term "Indians"
as it appeared in the NRTA.7 2 The finding at trial and on appeal was that
they were not, and the Supreme Court upheld that decision, concluding
that both provincial and federal legislation and documents of the time
distinguished clearly between "Indians" and "half-breeds," such that it
could not legitimately be concluded that the NRTA terms were intended to
embrace both.73
The reasons for judgment in the two cases have been combined here
for a double reason. First, the two cases are clearly companion cases-
that is to say, cases dealing with closely-related issues, assigned to the
same panel of judges, argued orally on the same day, and with decisions
handed down on the same day. The similarities in the structure and the
language of the two decisions make it entirely plausible that both were
written by the same person, and common sense reinforces the idea that
a single judge would be framing the initial wording of two such closely-
related judgments. Secondly, the two decisions are rather short, even more
so once the more routine aspects (background facts, case facts, summary
of lower court judgments) are subtracted. Combining them provides better
traction for the function word analysis.
Similarity Scores for R. v. Powley/R. v. Blais
Judge Similarity Score All-Judge








The results are not particularly conclusive. The clustering of all six judges
is rather close, but McLachlin C.J. and lacobucci J. are the closest, not
just because they are the pair ofjudges below the ALL JUDGES reference
71. Rv Blais, 2003 SCC 44, [2003] 2 SCR 236.
72. Ibid, atparas 1-4.
73. Ibid, at paras 42-44.
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point but because both of them enjoy the 5% edge in the all-judge
ratio that I have been treating as sufficient. It is a little surprising that
Binnie J. trails this pair; if the Supreme Court has recently had a "First
Nations" specialist, he is the most credible candidate."4 The methodology,
however, indicates either McLachlin C.J. or lacobucci J. (or, of course, a
collaborative exercise including both of them).
6. Wewaykum Indian Tribe v. Canada 2003
The circumstances for Wewaykum have been described above: an application
by a litigant for an order setting aside the decision in a recent case because
of the participation (to the extent of delivering the unanimous judgment)
of a judge who should have recused himself for prior involvement in the
subject of the dispute." An eight-judge panel (excluding the judge whose
participation in the earlier case was the point at issue) dismissed the
application on the grounds that no reasonable observer would think that
the Court's deliberations had been compromised or biased because of that
judge's involvement.7 6 The judgment is also interesting for its description
of the Court's decision-making procedures."
Similarity Scores for Wewaykum v. Canada
Judge Similarity Score All-Judge







The similarity scores point to a virtual tie between Bastarache and Arbour,
again suggesting that either one of them or both of them collaboratively
seem to have done the initial drafting of the reasons.
7. Reference re Same-Sex Marriage
The historical setting of the Same-Sex Marriage Reference was an attempt
by the Liberal government to deal with same-sex marriage in the face
of opposition in Parliament and a certain degree of public discomfort
74. The Supreme Court would no doubt deny any deliberate policy of specialization, but it is not
unreasonable to identify the specific legal or professional backgrounds ofjudges that wouldbe relevant
to specific areas of law.
75. Wewaykum 2003, supra note 49.
76. Ibidatpara3.
77. Ibid, atparas 92-93.
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with the subject." The initial set of questions that were presented to the
Supreme Court bordered on the innocuous (a strong suggestion that they
represented a political manoeuver rather than a serious request for advice).
The core question was whether Parliament had the legislative authority to
alter the statutory definition of marriage.79 Given that section 91.26 of the
Constitution Act 1867 specifically gives Parliament exclusive jurisdiction
over Marriage and Divorce, a "no" answer seemed unlikely, but it is
the framing of this question that explains why I earlier categorized the
subject matter of this case as "federalism."" At the last minute, so much
so as to delay the delivery of the judgment, Prime Minister Paul Martin
added the question most people always assumed was at stake-whether
the current statutory definition of marriage as a union between a man and
a woman violated the Charter." This would suggest that this was now
a Charter reference rather than a federalism reference, except that the
Supreme Court rather coyly declined to answer it on the grounds inter alia
that it was currently before Parliament. On the initial main question the
Court unsurprisingly ruled that Ottawa did have the necessary legislative
jurisdiction.8 2
Similarity Scores for Same-Sex Marriage Reference
Judge Similarity Score All-Judge









78. Reference Re Same-Sex Marriage, 2004 SCC 79, [2004] 3 SCR 698 [Marriage Reference].
79. Ibid, at para 2.
80. Constitution Act, 1867 (UK), 30 & 31 Victoria, c 3, s 91(26).
81. Marriage Reference, supra note 78, at para 3.
82. This is somewhat of a simplification The proposed federal legislation had also included a section
stating that the Act would not affect the freedom of officials of religious groups to refuse to perform
marriages not in accordance with their religious beliefs. The Supreme Court pointed out that this
section was not in Parliament's power, because authority over the performance or solemnization of
marriage is exclusively allocated to the provinces under s 91(12) of the Constitution Act, 1867 (UK),
30 & 31 Victoria, c 3. This too is clearly a strict federalism ruling.
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Like the two "By the Court" cases in the previous year, the Same-Sex
Marriage Reference yields frustrating results, with all the (Anglophone)
judges on the Court showing comparable similarity scores. Bastarache and
Abella JJ., however, post the lowest scores by the bare margin that I have
been accepting as sufficient, justifying the tentative conclusion that either
or both of them did the initial drafting.
8a. Solski (Tutor of) v. Quebec (Attorney General)
8b. Gosselin (Tutor of) v. Quebec (Attorney General)
8c. Okwuobi v. Lester B. Pearson School Board
Solski/Gosselin/Okwuobi constitute a trio of companion cases-so
described in the first paragraph of Okwuobi-dealing with the right
to minority language education in the Charter, and specifically the
procedures that Quebec has adopted for dealing with disputes arising over
these rights.8 3 Solski involved three families whose requests for certificates
of eligibility to attend public English-language schools had been denied."
Gosselin involved eight families, mostly Canadian citizens and mostly
educated in French in Quebec, who sought approval for their children to
attend English language classes. And Okwuobi involved three families
who had been denied admission to English-language public instruction
and had sought to by-pass the administrative appeal processes laid out in
the legislation by seeking an immediate remedy from the Superior Court
of Quebec. The common feature of all three was that the Supreme Court
decision upheld the provincial legislation regulating access to English-
language public education in Quebec (although two of the families in
Solski succeeded in persuading the Court that their children were indeed
eligible for the certificates of eligibility). The "companion case" nature of
the trio-assigned to identical panels, oral argument heard on the same
day, judgments handed down the same day-justifies their amalgamation
into a single case for present purposes, and the relatively short reasons
(once the background material has been excised) makes the combination
desirable for analytical purposes.
83. Gosselin trilogy, supra note 44.
84. It is curious that the case is indexed under Solski, because this was the only of the families
involved in the case that had abandoned the appeal following the trial judgment, so that the Court
found it was 'not necessary' to deal with their particular circumstances.
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Similarity Scores for Solski/Gosselin/Okwuobi
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Applying the methodology to this case is unusually difficult. For one
thing, this is the only one of the McLachlin Court's "By the Court"
judgments that does not make it possible to determine the language
of the initial draft of the reasons; for another, the subject matter of the
cases makes it more likely that those reasons would have been written in
French than in English." This is therefore the only case considered in this
paper for which the fact that the methodology may involve comparing
first-language apples with translation oranges is actually a problem, and
this directs caution in declaring an outcome. With these reservations, the
trio of Binnie, LeBel and Bastarache JJ. seem to stand out, either as solo
authors or as collaborating authors of this set of three judgments.
9. Mugesera v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration)
The basic content ofMugesera has been explained above-an immigration
case against a person connected to the Rwandan massacres, with an
adjudicator's finding that the allegations against Mugesera (incitement
to murder, genocide and hatred, and the commission of crimes against
humanity) were valid resulting in the issuing of a deportation order.8 6 The
Federal Court-Trial Division dismissed an application for judicial review,
but the Federal Court of Appeal reviewed and reversed the findings of fact
made by the Immigration Appeal Division and set aside the deportation
order.17 The Supreme Court allowed the government's appeal and restored
the order."
85. Ina somewhat dated study, I found a strong indication that appeals from a particular province or
region are more likely to be dealt with by a judge from that province or region. See Peter McCormick,
"The Supervisory Role of the Supreme Court of Canada" (1992) 3:2 SCLR 1.
86. Mugesera, supra note 51.
87. Ibidatpara3.
88. Ibid, atparas 14-18.
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Similarity Scores for Mugesera v. Canada
Judge Similarity Score All-Judge
44 most frequent words Ratio
ALL JUDGES 6.053






Once again, the resulting scores are fairly closely clustered, with a
virtual tie between two judges for the lowest score. McLachlin C. and
Bastarache J. are the most likely candidates for the initial writer, either
singly or jointly.
10. Provincial Court Judges' Assn. of New Brunswick v. New Brunswick
(Minister of Justice); Ontario Judges'Assn. v. Ontario (Management
Board); Bodner v. Alberta; Conference des juges du Quebec v.
Quebec (Attorney General); Minc v. Quebec (Attorney General)
Companion cases are one way that the Supreme Court deals with cases
that involve related or similar issues. Another device is to combine several
separate appeals into a single case for a single resolution, even where the
appeals are from different provinces. That was the situation with respect
to the four appeals here, from New Brunswick, Ontario, Alberta and
Quebec.8 9 All were cases that involved the institutional and procedural
arrangements for dealing with provincial judicial salaries that had resulted
from the transformative 1997 decision in Remuneration of Judges of
the Provincial Court of Prince Edward Island.90 As a result of that
earlier decision, all the provinces had established judicial compensation
committees that conformed closely to the principles that had been laid
down, but there had been considerable friction in the intervening years
about how a provincial government could proceed if it wished to reject
or modify the recommendations of those committees.91 These concerns
culminated in this set of appeals, and the Court dealt with them by (on the
one hand) standing firmly by the principles of the Remuneration Reference
89. Provincial Court Judges'Association ofNew Brunswick v New Brunswick (Minister ofJustice)
et al, 2005 SCC 44, [2005] 2 SCR 286.
90. Reference re Remuneration ofJudges of the Provincial Court ofPEI, [1997] 3 SCR 3, 150 DLR
(4th) 577. It should be noted that this case as well involved a single decision combining appeals from
three different provinces.
91. Ibid, atparas 11-12.
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but (on the other hand) clarifying the form and procedure for governments
that wished to challenge specific recommendations.9 2
Similarity Scores for Provincial Judges Ass'n
Judge Similarity Score All-Judge









Abella J. is by a good margin the most likely initial writer of the reasons
for this case, this being one of a half dozen decisive results. It is worth
noting that the Supreme Court has handed down a surprising number
of decisions over the last twenty years dealing with various aspects of
judicial independence.9 3 However, this is the first one to have drawn a "By
the Court" judgment-or, for that matter, to have been unanimous-and
those divided earlier decisions have been written by a surprising number
of different judges.
11. Canada (Justice) v. Khadr
The story of Omar Khadr and his connection to events in Afghanistan has
been an enduring issue for the Canadian government and for Canadian
courts. Khadr was a Canadian teenager fighting with the Taliban in
Afghanistan. He was captured by the Americans and transferred to
Guantanamo where he was charged with the murder of an American
soldier.9 4 The core problem in the immediate case was the extent to which
the Charter applied to government actions relating to Canadian citizens
acting outside of Canada.95 This was complicated by the fact that most
of the legal proceedings had been conducted by American officials in
circumstances that connected only loosely to normal judicial proceedings
in that country, as well as the fact that Khadr had been a minor at the
92. Ibid, atpara 27.
93. See Peter McCormick, "New Questions About an Old Concept: The Supreme Court of Canada's
Judicial Independence Jurisprudence" (2004) 37:4 Can J Political Science 839.
94. Canada (Minister ofJustice) v Khadr, 2008 SCC 28, [2008] 2 SCR 125, at para 5.
95. Ibid, atpara 19.
110 The Dalhousie Law Journal
time.9 6 The immediate case involved disclosure issues. Khadr was applying
for the disclosure of records of interviews with Canadian officials, and
of information given to U.S. authorities as a direct consequence of those
interviews. The Federal Court of Appeal had ruled that the Canadian
government had an obligation to disclose on the grounds that the principle
of comity-that Canadian officials are normally bound by local laws when
operating abroad-had been negated by the fact that the U.S. Supreme
Court had found that those processes violated both U.S. domestic law
and the international commitments to which both Canada and the U.S.
subscribed. The case was appealed to the Supreme Court which upheld the
decision of the Federal Court of Appeal, modestly altering the disclosure
rules that that court had enunciated.9 7
Similarity Scores for Canada v. Khadr
Judge Similarity Score All-Judge









The scores are such as to make Abella and Fish JJ. the most likely authors
for this decision.
12. BCE Incorporated v. 1976 Debenture Holders
This was a major decision in commercial and corporate law, dealing at
length with the responsibility of corporate boards of directors vis-a-vis the
diverse sets of stakeholders whose interests they are obliged to consider
and balance. 98 The case arose out of a leveraged buy-out that would
have had the effect of reducing the short-term trading values of several
major sets of debentures. 99 Although the plan was strongly supported by
BCE's shareholders at the recommendation of the board, the debenture-
holders sought relief under the oppression remedy in the Canada Business
96. Ibid, at para 23.
97. Ibidatpara8.
98. BCE Inc v 1976 Debentureholders, 2008 SCC 69, [2008] SCR 560 [BCE].
99. Ibidatpara4.
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Corporations Act.10 0 The Quebec Superior Court approved the arrangement
as fair and dismissed the claim, but the Court of Appeal set aside that
decision while ruling that the directors had failed adequately to consider
the reasonable expectations of the debenture-holders, although they
found it unnecessary to consider the oppression claim.10 1 BCE appealed
the overturning of the trial judge's approval of the arrangements, and the
debenture-holders appealed the dismissal of the claims for oppression.10 2
The Supreme Court allowed BCE's appeal and dismissed that of the
debenture-holders, and it did so in extended reasons that sought to clarify
the duties of corporate boards.1 0 3
The decision sits somewhat strangely in the list of "By the Court"
judgments, and does not look any more in place even should the list be
expanded backward through the Lamer and Dickson Courts. By far the
largest proportion of the reasonably substantive "By the Court" judgments
have dealt with major constitutional issues of various kinds-the Charter,
federalism, and First Nations are the major categories-and almost never
with non-constitutional cases. But BCE raises no constitutional dimensions
at all. On the other hand, the case was clearly a major decision dealing
with important issues, and has been described as a "seminal corporate law
case"10 4 and a "landmark" decision,' although others have been more
critical.1 0 6 It still remains the fact, however, that this is the only decision
dealing with commercial and corporate law that has ever been the subject
of a "By the Court" judgment by the Supreme Court of Canada. Time will
tell whether this is a one-shot aberration, or an early sign of an expansion
of the use of the device.
100. Canada Business Corporations Act, RSC 1985 c C-44, s 241.
101. BCE, supra note 98, atparas 23-28.
102. Ibid, at para 29.
103. Ibid, atpara 166.
104. See Jeffrey Bone, "The Supreme Court Revisiting Corporate Accountability" Alberta Law
Review Online Supplement (nd), online: <www.albertalawreview.com>.
105. For example, it has been included by the Ontario Justice Education Network as part of its
Landmark Cases package; see http://www.ojen.ca/sites/ojenca/files/resources/OJEN-landmark_
BCEen/20v3-allsections.pdf.
106. See e.g. Ed Waitzer & Johnny Jaswal, "Peoples, BCE and the Good Corporate 'Citizen"' (2009)
47:3 Osgoode Hall U 439.
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Similarity Scores for BCE Inc.
Judge Similarity Score All-Judge







The lowest similarity score for this decision is that of McLachlin C..;
indeed, it is narrowly the single lowest score for any judge for any of
the "By the Court" judgments that have been considered, and the spread
between this and the second highest score makes this the most decisive
finding in this paper. One might have expected a role for Deschamps J.,
given that she co-authored (with Major J.) the earlier case that had for
several years been considered the major precedent in the field, Peoples
Department Store.10 7 Because of my concern for the language issue, I
have been treating "initially written in English" as implying "by one or
more Anglophones" but of course this means that a genuine co-authorship
between an Anglophone and a francophone would not be detected; I
concede the possibility that this particular case may be the victim of that
strategy.
The inclusion (with an asterisk) of Bastarache J.'s name on the list
should be explained, because Bastarache J. had retired from the Court in the
interval between the oral argument on the appeal and the handing down of
the decision; the Supreme Court Act allows a retired justice to continue to
take part in the deliberations of appeal panels, but only for six months after
the date of retirement,"o' and the case was reserved for long enough that
Bastarache J.'s six months had expired. In their Dickson biography, Sharpe
and Roach mention that some initial drafts of reasons were "orphaned" by
deaths, retirements or poor health, and therefore appeared instead as "By
the Court" judgments.1 0 9 I ran the comparison numbers for Bastarache J. to
see if perhaps that might explain the otherwise unprecedented use of "By
the Court" for a case that raises no constitutional issues; as the numbers
show, it did not.
107. Peoples Department Stores Inc (Trustee of) v Wise, 2004 SCC 68, [2004] 3 SCR 461.
108. Supreme CourtAct, RSC 1985, c S-26, s 27(2).
109. Sharpe and Roach, supra note 10. The clearest example is Quebec (AG) v Healey [1987] 1 SCR
158, where the first paragraph of a "By the Court" judgment explains that the reasons were initially
drafted by a justice who died before the decision could be handed down.
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13. Canada (Prime Minister) v. Khadr
This case represents a continuation of the story described above. Khadr
had applied to the Canadian government for repatriation to Canada,
invoking Charter rights. The argument was that Canadian complicity in
inappropriate interrogation and imprisonment as established in Khadr
2008 engaged Canadian obligations despite the fact that his incarceration
and interrogation had been in and by another country.110 The federal
government having repeatedly and emphatically refused to make any such
application, Khadr made an application to the Federal Court seeking a
declaration that his Charter rights had been violated, and an order that
the government proceed with his repatriation.'" The trial judge accepted
this application (ruling that Canada must present a request to the United
States for Khadr's repatriation to Canada as soon as is practicable); and
the Federal Court of Appeal upheld the decision over a solo dissent.11 2 The
Supreme Court upheld the finding of a violation of Charter rights, but
rather than order immediate patriation it granted a declaration advising
the government of this finding and leaving it to the government to decide
what actions to take in respect of Khadr that were in conformity with the
Charter.1 13
Similarity Scores for Canada v. Khadr
Judge Similarity Score All-Judge









The similarity scores identify not a single most likely author, but a pair of
judges in a virtual tie. Cromwell J. is just marginally ahead of McLachlin
C. This suggests that either one of these two judges, or the two working
jointly, wrote the initial draft of the reasons.
110. Canada (Prime Minister) v Khadr, 2010 SCC 3, [2010] 1 SCR 44 [Khadr 2010].
111. Ibid, at para 8.
112. Ibid, at paras 9-10.
113. Ibid, at paras 26 and 46.
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14. R. v. Ahmad
This case involved the perennial judicial challenge of the appropriate
balance between the constitutional guarantee of individual rights and
freedoms and the pressing concerns of national security in an age of global
terrorism. More specifically, it is sometimes the case that the evidence
of possible or potential terrorist action will have been collected through
procedures that cannot be fully explored in court because they might
disclose potentially injurious or sensitive government information.1 1 4 At
issue, therefore, is the question of the capacity of the accused to hear the
evidence against them and to make full answer and defence, an element
that the Court has found within the notion of a right to a fair trial. As
well, judicial independence is potentially compromised by rules that
prevent a full exploration and explanation of the case before them."' The
trial court judge initially hearing the application alleging a constitutional
violation struck down the legislation with respect to certain issues; the
case was appealed directly from the Ontario Superior Court of Justice to
the Supreme Court (a per saltum appeal that bypassed the provincial Court
of Appeal), which allowed the appeal and upheld the statute "properly
understood and applied" as constitutionally valid.1 16
Similarity Scores for R. v. Ahmad
Judge Similarity Score All-Judge









Of all the cases considered in this paper, this is the most inconclusive. The
margin I have been treating as sufficient to support a result has between
a 5% spread in the All-Judge Ratio, but for this case there are no fewer
than four judges whose scores are within this range, with a fifth judge only
slightly outside. The methodology gives no clear indication as to which
judge or pair of judges might have written these reasons.
114. R vAhmad, 2011 SCC 6, [2011] 1 SCR 110 at paras 1-2.
115. Ibid, at para 6.
116. Ibid, at para 3.
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15. Reference re Securities Act...
Through the financial crises of the early 21st century, it was often
observed that alone among the major economies of the world, Canada did
not have a federal securities regulator; rather, each province had its own
fully independent and somewhat different procedure and structures for the
regulation of securities.' 8 Against this backdrop, and following through
on the Harper government's "open federalism" approach that sought the
disentanglement of federal and provincial policies and the more vigorous
assertion of appropriately federal powers, the federal government proposed
establishing a national securities regulator.119 This was welcomed by some
provinces but strongly opposed by others (most notably Quebec and
Alberta), and the federal government sought an advisory opinion on the
constitutionality of the proposed legislation from the Supreme Court. 120
Presumably the intention was to clear up any doubts that might exist, and
to position the federal government more favourably for any negotiations
that might follow. If so, the gambit failed spectacularly when the Supreme
Court declared that the federal government did not have the jurisdiction
to enact the legislation, and it used the opportunity to give the federal
government something of a lecture on modem Canadian federalism and its
foundation in intergovernmental cooperation. 12 1 It was the first of several
dramatic major setbacks for the Harper government in constitutional cases
before the Supreme Court.
Similarity Scores for Securities Reference
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117. Securities Reference, supra note 5.
118. Ibid, at para 4.
119. Ibid, at para 29.
120. Ibid, at para 34.
121. Ibid, atparas 7-10.
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Again, the similarities scores create a cluster of three judges, Fish J. and
McLachlin C.J. and Abella J., who are equally likely, on the basic of
function-word usage, to have written or to have collaborated in the writing
of the reasons. The inclusion of Fish J. is slightly surprising, given the fact
that he has tended not to be a major player on the Court during his years
of service.122
16. Reference re Supreme Court Act, Sections 5 & 6 (Nadon)
This case grew out of Prime Minister Stephen Harper's appointment
of Justice Marc Nadon to the Supreme Court vacancy created by the
retirement of Fish J. A Toronto lawyer applied for a judicial declaration
that Nadon J., who had been sitting on the Federal Court of Appeal, was
ineligible for appointment to the Supreme Court.1 2 3 It was an argument that
hinged on the wording of section 6 of the Supreme Court Act (focusing
on Quebec) and how it differed from section 5 (dealing with Supreme
Court appointment eligibility more generally).1 2 4 The federal government
chose to cut short the decision-and-appeal process by posing the question
directly to the Supreme Court, getting the answer that it definitely was
not hoping for-appointments to the three Quebec seats on the Supreme
Court must be from the bar of Quebec or the provincial superior courts of
Quebec such that Nadon J. did not qualify and therefore had never been
appointed to the Court.12 5 The case is of further interest for its aftermath,
in the form of an unusual-even unique - confrontation between the Chief
Justice and the Prime Minister, who chose to regard her attempt to warn
him about the possible complications as inappropriate "lobbying."12 6
As mentioned above, the Nadon decision is a "not quite" "By the
Court" judgment, given that there was a solo dissent by Moldaver J.
that denies the anonymous/unanimous format, but the highly unusual
"joint judgment of seven names" format is similar enough in spirit to the
"normal" "By the Court" that it would be unreasonable not to include it. If
anything, this non-standard approach makes it more important to include
it, because it so clearly signals that the Court was aiming for the impassive
solidarity of a "By the Court" and narrowly missed it.
122. See McCormick, "Judgment and Opportunity," supra note 20.
123. Nadon Reference, supra note 53.
124. Ibid, at paras 13-14.
125. Ibid, atparas 69-71.
126. Leslie MacKinnon, "Beverley McLaclin, PMO give dueling statements in appointment fight,"
CBC News (1 May 2014), online: <www.cbc.ca>.
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The lowest similarity score is that of McLachlin C. who is therefore
the most likely author of the initial draft (although not by as definitive as
margin as has been the case for some of the other decisions that this paper
has attributed to her).
17. Reference re Senate Reform
One of the campaign promises of the Conservative party had been
Senate reform, and when he became prime minister, Stephen Harper
introduced two different pieces of legislation-one on senator-selection
procedures that would have engaged the provincial governments in an
election process of sorts, another on Senatorial terms of office-that he
insisted were within the jurisdiction of Parliament, but that critics argued
would require a formal constitutional amendment including approval by
the appropriate number of provinces (a further point of argument being
whether it was the "7/50" formula or all-province unanimity that was
necessary). After a number of years of controversy, brought to a head by
the Quebec government's submission of its own reference question on
the subject to its own provincial court of appeal, the Harper government
sought an advisory opinion on a range of Senate-reform questions from
the Supreme Court of Canada. 12 7 A unanimous Supreme Court used a "By
the Court" judgment to declare that all save the most minor of the elements
of those questions (specifically, the ones involving the anachronistically
low property qualifications for Senatorial appointment) required formal
constitutional amendment with varying degrees of provincial approval.128
127. Senate Reference, supra note 6.
128. Ibid, at para 3.
118 The Dalhousie Law Journal
Similarity Scores for Senate Reform Reference
Judge Similarity Score All-Judge









As with the Nadon case earlier in the same year, and by a very similar
margin, McLachlin C. has the lowest similarity score.
18. Carter v. Canada (Attorney General)
The issue of a Charter claim to a right of assisted suicide was dealt
with by the Supreme Court in 1993, in the Rodriguez case, resulting in
a decision by the narrowest possible 5-4 margin that the Criminal Code
sections prohibiting the counselling or assisting of suicide do not violate
the Charter, either the right to life and liberty or the right to equality. 129In
2015, the same question was back before the Court again. 130 This time it
received a different answer: the relevant sections "unjustifiably infringed"
section 7 of the Charter in a manner that was not in accordance with the
principles of fundamental justice and that was not saved by the reasonable
limits of section 1 of the Charter.131 The declaration of invalidity was
suspended for twelve months to allow governments to devise appropriate
legislative and regulatory responses.1 3 2
129. Rodriguez v British Columbia (AG), [1993] 3 SCR 519, [1993] SCJ No 94.
130. Carter v Canada (AG), 2015 SCC 5, [2015] 1 SCR 331.
131. Ibid, at para 4.
132. Ibid, at para 128.
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No single judge stands clear from the table for the similarity scores, but
Cromwell J. and McLachlin C. are the two for which there is the strongest
indication that they were involved, separately or jointly, in writing the
initial drafts of the reasons. The gap between their scores and those of the
other judges (and not just the fact that these are the two who are below the
"all judges" score) is sufficient to make this finding reasonably solid.
19. R. v. Smith
Smith is a somewhat curious inclusion in the "By the Court" set, if only
because of its modest length; the two Khadr cases aside, this is the only
"By the Court," other than some of the companion cases, to fall below
7,000 words and it falls well below that notional threshold. 133 The issue
was straightforward-the Marihuana Medical Access Regulations limit
the lawful possession of medical marihuana to dried marihuana, which is
problematic for those who think that other forms of marihuana are more
effective, and even more so, for people who do not smoke and do not
wish to smoke. 134 Agreeing with the British Columbia Court ofAppeal that
the distinction between the different forms of marihuana was arbitrary,
the Supreme Court found the regulations unconstitutional. The threat of
imprisonment triggered section 7 concerns about the right to liberty, the
limits violated the principles of fundamental justice because they were
arbitrary, and the disconnect between the prohibition and its alleged object
meant that they were not saved by section 1 reasonable limits. 135
133. R v Smith, 2015 SCC 34, [2015] 2 SCR 602.
134. Ibid, at para 1.
135. Ibid, at paras 30-34.
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Similarity Scores for R. v. Smith 2015
Judge Similarity Score All-Judge






Once again, and by a margin similar to that in Carter, McLachlin C.J. and
Cromwell J. have the lowest similarity scores, such that it is reasonable to
think that one or both of these two were involved in the initial drafting,
although the short length of the reasons (less than 3,000 words once the
preliminary material and the block quotes are removed) qualifies the
findings.
20. Summary
The point of this section was to go through the "By the Court" judgments
of the McLachlin Court, running function word frequencies for each of
the judges against the same count for each "By the Court" judgment. On
that basis, I suggested "probable" solo authors (lowest "similarity score"
differences) for eight of the judgments, and two orthree "possible" authors
for each of the ten such cases for which there was no clear single lowest
score. These results are summarized in the Table below; the asterisks
indicate the most decisive of the findings.
Probable and Possible authors, "By the Court" judgments of the
MeLachlin Court
Case Probable author Possible author
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Re Securities Act Fish
McLachlin
Abella
Re Supreme CourtAct McLachlin
Re Senate Reform McLachlin
Carter v. Canada Cromwell
McLachlin
R. v. Smith McLachlin
Cromwell
Before proceeding to a discussion of the results, however, I would suggest
a possible cross-check to confirm or qualify the findings above.
VIII. Supplementary confirmation: the block quotation factor
As indicated above, the first step in generating a block of words to serve as
the basic comparison point for each of the judges was to remove the block
quotes that make up a significant part of many Supreme Court judgments.
If we are measuring how often specific judges use specific function words,
it distorts the results to include passages that are taken from other writers.
And the larger the proportion of such quotations, the greater the distortion.
The constitutional decisions of the McLachlin Court (given that "By the
Court" is used almost exclusively for constitutional cases) provide the
reasonable comparison base. The highest proportion of block quotes in
a single such judgment was 37.4% -that is to say, almost four words in
every ten were quoted from some other source-and the case in question
was the Moreau-Berube36 judgment by Arbour J. At the other extreme,
the lowest proportion was zero-not a single quotation of sufficient length
to be separated into block text-and the case in question was the R. v.
Godinl3 7 judgment by Cromwell J. The block quotation word share for the
combined single-authored reasons for judgment in all constitutional law
decisions of the McLachlin Court was 13.5%.
But this identification of outliers points us to a more useful conclusion:
it is not only that some cases involved a higher proportion of quoted
136. Moreau-Berube v New Brunswick (Judicial Council), 2002 SCC 11, [2002] 1 SCR 249.
137. 2009 SCC 26, [2009] 2 SCR 3.
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material than others, but that some judges are much more likely than others
to use high proportions of quotations. Moreover, the differences are large
enough and consistent enough as to promise a degree of predictability. The
table below reflects this finding:
Direct quotation proportions in constitutional judgments, by judge
Judge Judgments Total words Quotation %
Abella 10 77,406 24.97%
Arbour 10 113,209 19.23%
Charron 7 69,672 19.15%
Iacobucci 7 81,612 17.84%
Major 6 42,687 17.23%
Bastarache 7 87,039 16.41%
Binnie 20 216,475 16.27%
Moldaver 4 24,255 14.14%
ALL JUDGES 159 1,587,294 13.49%
L'Heureux-Dub6 1 13,189 13.36%
Gonthier 6 91,873 13.34%
Wagner 1 10,738 12.98%
Deschamps 12 98,430 12.43%
Rothstein 6 57,148 12.29%
LeBel 18 203,038 11.90%
Fish 4 26,943 9.30%
McLachlin 34 315,379 6.52%
Cromwell 6 51,003 5.45%
Karakatsanis 1 7,198 2.92%
The standard deviation-the accepted way of assessing the degree of
variation-for the quotation word percentage for the eighteen judges is
5.39%. There are three judges (Abella, Arbour and Charron JJ.) whose
quotation word percentage is more than a standard deviation above (for
Abella J., more than two standard deviations above) the all-judge figure;
and another four (lacobucci, Major, Bastarache and Binnie JJ.) who are
more than half a deviation above the average. These two sets-that we
might call very high and high respectively-together account for about
40% of all majority and unanimous authored judgments of the McLachlin
Court on constitutional cases.
Conversely, there are three judges (Karakatsanis and Cromwell JJ.
and McLachlin C.J.) whose quotation word percentage is more than
one standard deviation below the all-judge figure; and one further judge
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(Fish J.) who is more than one half a standard deviation lower than average.
These two sets-that we might call very low and low respectively-
together account for about 30% of the McLachlin Court's authored
judgments on constitutional law.
Finally, there are seven judges (Moldaver, L'Heureux-Dube, Gonthier,
Wagner, Deschamps, Rothstein and LeBel JJ.) whose quotation word
percentage is within half a standard deviation of the all-court figure; this
set of judges-that we might call average-together account for about
30% of the McLachlin Court's authored constitutional judgments.
This is, I suggest, simply a matter of persisting personal style. No
evaluative purpose is to be read into these calculations. There is no obvious
basis for suggesting that Judge X is not quoting enough, or that Judge Y is
quoting too much. It is not that higher or lower quoting judges cited more
(or less) judicial authority, or different judicial authority, or more (or less)
academic authority; the distinction seems to be simply between those who
prefer to summarize or paraphrase, and those who prefer to quote directly,
before proceeding with the analysis and conclusions.
On a similar logic, we can calculate the quoted word percentage for
each of the "By the Court" judgments delivered by the McLachlin Court.
These figures appear below:
Direct quotations as proportion of total word length, BTC judgments
Case Citation Quotation %
Senate Reference 2014 SCC 32 23.96%
Solski/Okwubi/Gosselin 2005 SCC 14/15/16 20.56%
Wewaykum 2003 SCC 45 19.16%
Burns & Raffay 2001 SCC 07 18.65%
Powley/Blais 2003 SCC 43/44 14.47%
Mugesera 2005 SCC 40 14.39%
ALL "BY THE COURT"s 11.48%
Supreme CourtAct (Nadon) 2014 SCC 21 11.32%
Provincial Judges Assn. 2005 SCC 44 9.95%
Re Same Sex Marriage 2004 SCC 79 7.59%
Suresh 2002 SCC 01 7.43%
Ahmad 2011 SCC 06 4.83%
BCE Inc. 2008 SCC 69 3.73%
Carter 2005 SCC 5 3.73%
Latimer 2001 SCC 01 3.71%
Khadr 2010 2010 SCC 03 2.84%
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Securities Reference 2011 SCC 55 2.75%
Firearms Reference 2000 SCC 31 0.71%
Khadr 2008 2008 SCC 28 0.0%
Smith 2015 SCC 34 0.0%
The over-all quotation word percentage is slightly lower for "By the Court"
judgments than for authored reasons-11.8 %, as against 13.5% -and the
standard deviation is higher, at 8.8%. As with judges, there are "By the
Court" judgments at the top of the list for which the word percentage of
block quotations is more than a standard deviation higher than the figure
for all "By the Court" judgments. And there are cases at the bottom of the
list that are more than a standard deviation lower.
It would be far too much to suggest that we could simply map these
quotation percentages for each "By the Court" judgment onto each judge's
individual percentages. Too many variables are at play to make these
numbers anything more than general pointers. But the general pointers
provide a second and complementary angle to the suggestions that
emerged from the function word analysis. That is to say: we can identify
high, medium, and low judges for quotation frequency, and we can identify
high, medium, and low "By the Court" judgments on the same basis; and
then we can ask whether this is consistent with the established practice of
the judges who have been identified as probable or possible authors for
each judgment. For example, a low quotation word count for a judgment
that has been tentatively assigned to McLachlin C.J. would be consistent;
a low quotation word count for a judgment tentatively assigned to Abella
J. would not. If the two are consistent, this will be treated as confirmation
of a sort of the attribution.
The quotation factor: Judges and "By the Court" judgments
Quotation Tentative Quotation
Case Count Author Usage Confirmed?
Re Firearms Act Very low McLachlin Very low Yes
Latimer Very low Major Average No
Burns & Raffay High Binnie High Yes
Suresh Very low McLachlin Very low Yes
Powley/Blais Medium McLachlin Very low No
lacobucci Low No
Wewaykum Very high Bastarache High Yes
Arbour Very high Yes
Re Same Sex Marriage Very low Bastarache Average No
Abella Very High No
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Solski/Okwubi/ Very high Binnie High Yes
Gosselin Lebel Low No
Bastarache Average No
Mugesera Medium McLachlin Very low No
Bastarache Average Yes
Provincial Judges Assn. Medium Abella Very high No
Khadr 2008 Very low Abella Very high No
Fish Low Yes
BCE Inc. Very low McLachlin Very low Yes
Khadr 2010 Very low Cromwell Very low Yes
McLachlin Very low Yes
Ahmad Very low Inconclusive n.a.
Re Securities Act Low Fish Low Yes
McLachlin Very low Yes
Abella Very high No
Re Sup. CtAct (Nadon) Medium McLachlin Very low No
Re Senate Reform High McLachlin Very low No
Carter v Canada Very low McLachlin Very low Yes
Cromwell Very low Yes
R. v. Smith Very low McLachlin Very low Yes
Cromwell Very low Yes
The results are only modestly confirming. Of those eight cases for which
a single probable first-draft author had been identified, only four were
consistent with the quotation word count of the "By the Court" judgment
involved-but for three of those the Chief Justice was the judge in
question, and they include three of the five cases where the results of the
function word analysis were the most strongly indicative. There were ten
cases for which two or three judges had been indicated as a possible first-
draft author, and for only two of these were both of the suggestions not
consistent with the quotation frequency. In general, then, the quotation
factor only modestly reinforces the findings of the function word analysis.
Conclusion
"By the Court" judgments are a striking and relatively recent development
for the Supreme Court's presentation of its decisions. At least in terms of
the "grand tradition" explained above, it is a practice largely restricted to
high-profile cases involving constitutional issues. The central feature of
this judgment-presentation style is anonymity, which raises the question of
whether this means "we will not tell you who is the lead author" or "there
is no lead author because we sat down and drafted it as a group." Using
function word analysis, I attempted to penetrate this screening device to
see if it is possible to identify a lead author, not denying that there is a
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collegial dimension to all judgments that are the product of the circulate-
and-revise process.
For almost all of the cases, probable or possible authors could be
identified. The initial count of twenty-two significant "By the Court"
judgments was effectively reduced to nineteen by the two sets of
companion cases (Powley and Blais, Solski, Gosselin and Okwuobi), and it
was possible to identify strongly probable single authors for eight of them,
and to narrow the focus to (usually) two and (sometimes) three judges for
all but one of the others.
This article began by suggesting that there were four different ways
of understanding the "By the Court" practice, with distinctly different
implications for the evolution of our recently powerful and high profile
court. The first was the "business as usual" model that would have seen the
lead writing rotating within a sub-set of senior judges; the second was the
"limited partnership" model that would have identified a smaller subset
(usually a pair of judges) within the unanimous panel; the third was the
leader-centric model that would have attributed most of the judgments to
the pen of the Chief Justice; and the fourth was the institutional model that
would have suggested the extensive sharing of the actual writing between
all or most of the judges on the specific panel. What the results actually
suggest is a combination of the middle two, in such a way as to emphasize
the role of the Chief Justice.
More than one-third of the "By the Court" judgments-eight out of the
nineteen-exhibit function word similarity scores that justify attribution of
the judgment to specific solo justices; in some cases (such as the Firearms
Reference, Latimer, Suresh, Provincial Judges and BCE), the results are
particularly clear-cut. Five of these eight solo attributions are to the Chief
Justice, with one each to Major, Binnie and Abella JJ. On this segment
of the decisions, the leader-centric model is clearly justified-but it only
accounts for about one-third of the total.
Only a single decision (Ahmad) generated similarity scores such that
there are four or five judges who are almost equally credible as the lead
authors-raising the possibility that perhaps none of them were, and that
all or most of the panel was making significant contributions to the reasons
as they finally appeared. This is the institutional model, as exemplified by
the self-description of the single "By the Board" decision of the UK Privy
Council, referred to above-but it only accounts for a single case of the
nineteen.
More than halfthe "By the Court" cases-ten out ofnineteen-generate
similarity scores suggesting that two (or, in two cases, three) members of
the panel were equally or comparably likely to have written the reasons.
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This is consistent with (although of course it does not prove) the possibility
that they may well have collaborated in the writing of joint reasons. The
joint authorship phenomenon is a relatively recent development, dating
back only to the mid 1990s when Cory and lacobucci JJ. began their
unusual degree of collaboration, although the co-authorship of a pair of
judges has become a more routine part of the Court's performance since
then and now accounts for one judgment in every ten. If the message of
these numbers is indeed this kind ofjoint authorship behind the curtain of
anonymity, it is on the one hand fairly wide-spread-eight of the eighteen
judges who served on the McLachlin C. court show up on this list at least
once-but at the same time distinctly concentrated. McLachlin C. was
involved in six of the ten cases. Bastarache was the otherjudge most likely
to appear in the first half of the Chief Justiceship, Abella and Cromwell
JJ. in the latter half Between them, these four account for two-thirds of
the examples of apparently shared judgment-writing. As I have suggested
elsewhere,1 3 8 one implication of the co-authorship phenomenon is an
attenuation of the accountability of individual judges-we cannot know
which of the judges should be given how much responsibility for which
parts of the joint judgment-and this is even more the case when the co-
authorship operates behind the further screen of "By the Court." At the
same time, however, the leader-centric model is tangentially reinforced-
just as McLachlin C. stands out in the "clear single author" set, so she is
by a good margin the one most visibly present in the possible collaboration
set.
It is also significant in this light that all but one of the McLachlin
Court's "By the Court" judgments have been written in English-18 out
of 19 is a remarkable predominance. It is entirely possible, of course, that
some of the suggested two-person co-authorships indicated in the previous
paragraph, are actually three-or-more collaborations which include
francophones, but for a bilingual institution the imbalance is striking.
What this analysis does not answer is whether the present levels of
"By the Court" use will continue. In recent years, the use of the device has
been highlighted by a string of constitutional references from the federal
government that has led to unprecedented public tensions between the
Court and the national government; but the trend toward the use of this
decision-presentation style started early enough in the McLachlin Chief
Justiceship (even before Prime Minister Harper took office) that these
cases and this tension must be seen as a culmination rather than atriggering
factor. Given the use of "By the Court" for major constitutional decisions,
138. McCormick, "Spotlight," supra note 1.
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it was perhaps inevitable that if there was to be any confrontation between
Court and government, these would be the cases at the center of the
controversy, but this does not answer why the McLachlin Court stepped
up its use of the device in the first place.
To put the same question in blunter terms: has this truly become a
standard modus operandi of the Court as an ongoing institution, its regular
way of dealing with a subset of its important cases on constitutional
issues? Or has it only become the standard practice of this particular
Chief Justice, something that may or may not survive into the next chief
justiceship? Given that McLachlin C.1. will retire within the next three
years after the longest chiefjusticeship in the history of the institution, this
is an important question. Without getting into the question of who is likely
to succeed her,13 9 the obvious question is: will the "By the Court" format
retain its current levels of use and high profile? And does this depend on
whether she is succeeded by a francophone or an Anglophone?
The jury is still out on whether "By the Court" is truly the new reality
for the modern Supreme Court's handling of major constitutional issues,
or whether the last fifteen years are simply one chapter in a larger and more
complex story. What is undeniable, however, is that its recent use has been
extensive enough and important enough to call for more investigation than
the practice has received to date. This paper is a contribution to such an
investigation.
139. Which is not to deny that I have already chimed in on this question; see Peter McCormick,
"Choosing the Chief: Alternation, Duality and Beyond" (2013) 47:1 J of Can Studies 5.
